Browse Exhibits (1 total)

“The real truth of the Kuomintang-Communist problem in China is not one of political differences. It is simply a struggle for political power. The differences are more personal than doctrinal.” (Relations between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang, page 5)

Setting the Stage

Before World War II, the two largest political parties in China were the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Kuomintang (KMT), also known as Guomindang, or the Nationalist Party. They were historically in violent conflict with each other, but during WWII a temporary alliance referred to as the United Second Front pitted both the KMT and CCP against the invading Japanese army instead of against each other. However, after World War II, the fighting between the parties continued, extending into the Chinese Civil War and eventually, after losing the civil war in 1949, many of the KMT leaders retreated to Taiwan, and the CCP founded the People’s Republic of China. 

What happened during the supposed alliance between these two parties? Explore this time period and dynamic through a number of documents and pages in our collection!

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For more information about the relationship between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party from early World War II up to 1940, and access to more resources on this topic, visit this post: The Second United Front: A KMT and CCP Alliance in Name, but not in Practice

For more information about the Chinese Civil War between the Kuomintang and the Communists after the end of World War II, and the factors that shaped the Communist victory, visit this post: Civil War of China: Chinese Communist Party vs Kuomintang

A Timeline of Tension in World War II through Archival Reports

1943

In 1943 The Kuomintang were the primary governing power of China, and during that year's last Plenary meeting of the Central Executive Committee, it was demonstrated that China’s internal problems were taking precedence over the war interest. In this report, the author states that open violence between the two parties is unlikely to occur before the war ends, though tensions are high. Indeed, despite the quote presented at the top of this page, fundamental differences between the parties are laid out indicating that the Kuomintang are nationalistic and claim to follow Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People: nationalism, democracy, and people’s livelihoods and that the Communists instead are international and stand for proletarian dictatorship and agrarian revolution, suggesting clear ideological differences that were difficult to overcome. 

1944

In a wide-covering document from the American Embassy in Chungking in 1944, it is indicated that despite Chinese government consideration of a committee dedicated to continuing negotiations with CCP representatives, the Generalissimo--the highest military official-- “entertained little hope of a satisfactory settlement” (page 5).

Later that year, another report was released, detailing information from an interview with General Ho Ying-chin’s (He Yingqin), an important Kuomintang official. This document shows these “personal” differences that are claimed to be at the heart of the Kuomintang-Communist problem and concludes that as their views are diametrically opposed to each other, that this can be expected to continue to cause trouble between the groups. 

For example, the General claimed that the Communist armies were not actually fighting the Japanese but only the Kuomintang, a statement that the report’s author rejects, noting other reports indicating Chinese Communist armies actively resisting the Japanese army, but that the General does not believe. The document from 1943’s declaration that violence between these groups is unlikely during the war does not appear to be a belief reflected by a highstanding member of one of the parties in discussion. The General also entirely rejected the idea of guerilla warfare as something that contributes to the war effort--potentially reflecting the demands of the Central Government towards the Red Army and juxtaposing the Communist leader’s beliefs that their focus “will be most useful for guerrilla operations” (page 2). 

The claims of the General and the Central Government contradicting the information the author and interviewer have about the efforts and successes of the Chinese Communists increasingly show the difficulties in these two groups supposedly trying to work together and indicates that since the previous year, the relationship has not gotten less tense, particularly with the accusations of the Communists killing more Chinese people than Japanese troops, which the General indicated via showing a notebook listing names of those killed to the interviewer.

Even later in 1994, a lengthy document was produced giving information on that years’ meeting of the Third Plenary Session of the People's Political Council, held on September 15 of that year. This document shows the perspectives from a variety of sources on this meeting and included in this document are copies of the original reports being discussed translated into English, allowing readers to construct their own opinions on the proceedings of this meeting. 

During the meeting, General Chang Chih-chung, representing the Kuomintang Government, and Mr. Lin Tsu-han, representing the Chinese Communists, described the four months of negotiations that had been occurring between their two groups and the proposals each party had suggested to one another. This meeting was also open to the public and attended by the whole People's Political Council's membership and around 800 others. Indeed, the initial ideas behind this meeting were potentially positive when considering Kuomintang-Communist relations. As one of the translated report notes, the session being open to the public created a spirit of openness during the meeting and all speakers were courteous and civil. 

That translated report specifically indicates the opinions of Councillors Wang Yun-wu and Hu Lin, and presents an outsider-view of this contentious relationship as seen by how Councillor Wang described himself. He said he is "without party and faction," and his opinions were merely expressed in his "capacity as a citizen and a representative of the people" (page 24-25). Exploring this document allows us to see opinions of people at the time who are perhaps not as biased towards or against either party as previous documents indicating opinions of the Kuomintang or the Communists were about each other. 

Wang described what he believes the root of the Kuomintang-Communist relationship problems are: the popularization of political power and the unification of the military, and what Wang indicates is that members of every party want to eventually democratize the government--something Hu concurs. Wang also describes both parties representatives’ speeches and demeanors as "straightforward and earnest," (page 27) with Wang appearing somewhat hopeful and positive about the potential of Kuomintang-Communist relations, though he notes that these problems will of course still take time to fix.  

Also included in this document are translations of the reports by Minister Chang Chih-Chung and Mr. Lin Tsu-Han, the communist version of Lin's report including a paragraph that did not appear in the official reporting about the meeting published in Chungking by the government, and communist newspaper articles indicating  Communist criticism of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's opening address to the People's Political Council, Communists comment on the negotiations and desire for a reorganization of,  and Communist accusation that Kuomintang organizations have grossly misrepresented Lin Tsu-han's statements in a propagandistic way. 

Many of these reports are not as optimistic as the councillors', particularly the Communist articles, which reflect the still ongoing tensions between these two groups. The Communists accuse the Central Government of not being sincere in their negotiations, of playing tricks and even Lin Tsu-han who was a part of the negotiations and described himself as "inspirited" about them, noted that the two parties had such different ideas of proposals they simply could not agree.

Ultimately, the representatives being able to converse courteously, give their proposals to one another and share this information with the council did not appear to reflect their overarching parties' lack of desire to acquiesce to each other's proposals that would bring them more together. As Lin Tsu-Han stated in his report:

"There is great difference in opinions of the two parties, no final decision in the negotiations have been reached... there is not yet any result that I can report to you after negotiating for all these four months" (page 18)

A final document in our collection on this topic from 1944 is dated to late November and further continues the previous document's discussion of proposals that each political party had for each other, with it noting Chou En Lai, the CCP Representative to Chungking, bringing specific proposals for initiating peace with the Kuomintang Party; proposals primarily reflective of these earlier talks, such as with proposing the Communists' troops be given the same command, standardization, and treatment as all military forces and the sharing of the highest military command.

Clearly, by the end of 1944, though attempts at negotiation appear to have been legitimately made, the specific issues at the heart of the KMT and CCPs disagreements--that of the military and of governmental control--are still unsolved.

1945

1945 was the year that World War II ended, but prior to that, in early 1945, a San Francisco, California-based daily newspaper had an article on the subject. Unlike previous newspaper articles we have recorded on this subject, this newspaper, The Chinese Nationalist Daily is associated with the Kuomintang Party, yet the opinion of their opposing party is similar to how the Communists described the Kuomintang prior--with this article questioning the sincerity of the Chinese Communists' messaging, accusing them of propaganda, and bringing up the issue of military control and government once again, stating that the Central Government was willing to form a coalition government but the Communist's unwillingness to "give up their military power" made this exchange fizzle out (page 2). Years have passed, negotiations have been continually ongoing, and no real progress has been made. 

The last document on this subject was written just a few months before the end of the war and includes additional information that overseas Chinese in New York also have no confidence in the negotiations between the KMT and CCP. This document does actually uncover another complication possibly impeding a potential settlement between those two groups, the claims that the Communists are being backed by "Washington, Moscow and London" (page 1) to increase their demands against the Kuomintang in exchange for uniting their armies. 

What this all Means

None of these documents truly indicate a major event occurring between the Kuomintang and Communists during this time in World War II, no progress and no deterioration. This tension between these political parties has been ongoing for a long time, and their supposed alliance with the Second United Front was not enough to actually fully unify them or even lead them to believe they could be unified as evidenced by the fact that their armies were separate during this part of the war. Their front, militarily speaking, was not, in fact, united.