Browse Exhibits (11 total)

     During WWII, the Allied powers (the most powerful being the U.S., the U.K., the Soviet Union, China, and France) battled the Axis powers (the most powerful being Germany, Italy, and Japan). The Pacific Theater of the war refers to Japan, China, the Philippines, and land battles in the Pacific Ocean. Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, in December 1941, prompting the U.S. to declare war on Japan. By the end of 1941, the Japanese had invaded the Philippines, Burma, and Hong Kong, and they continued capturing U.S. military bases and attacking European-controlled lands in 1942. In 1943 and 1944, the Allies recaptured much of the territory the Imperial Japanese Army had occupied. Still, there was more territory left to liberate. The Philippines was next, with airfields that were strategically important to the war effort. The US- and UK-led invasion of the Philippines began in January of 1945, and continued until September 3, a day after the Japanese formally surrendered. 

     During the 1945 recapture of the Philippines and other Japanese-controlled territories, a unit called the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section (ATIS) Advanced Echelon became incredibly important. Japanese officers kept detailed records, and very few people stopped to destroy documents as they prepared for a battle they believed they would win. The ATIS Advanced Echelons were in the field of battle, capturing and translating documents left behind and interrogating soldiers. They were crucial to the war. They intercepted messages containing commands for soldiers, translated and interpreted maps of underground tunnels and secret bases, discovered plans for attacks and defense measures, and recovered intelligence on how Japanese forces were responding to Allied actions. 

    The U.S. 8th Army, 6th Army, and other divisions worked with the UK’s army and other allied forces to recapture Japanese-controlled lands and occupied Japan after the war ended. The 8th Army’s ATIS Advanced Echelon captured and translated hundreds of documents (links to archive/collection). Many of these were captured from airfields or after battles in the Philippines. On Luzon, the largest island in the Philippines, there were a few major airfields. One of these is Clark Air Field. It was responsible for sinking and/or damaging over 70 U.S. vessels by the end of 1944, and its position on the coast meant it was crucial for control over the port and coastline, and could be used to attack planes and ships passing by. Clark Field was surrounded by anti-aircraft defenses and soldiers who monitored Allied movements. Still, the U.S. planned an attack that would work even with the advanced notice and the airfield's defense system. They began the attack in January and continued to fight until February, when they succeeded. 

     One of the documents the 8th Army ATIS Advanced Echelon translated was a 50-page listing of all aircraft arrivals and departures from Clark Field. From this document, the U.S. identified the names of pilots and officials, as well as the pilots’ aircraft models and serial numbers. The date and time are listed, along with details about the mission each plane was on. Knowing where planes were going, what they were carrying, and when allowed them to make connections between other documents they found, the reports from soldiers they interrogated, and any other intelligence they may have gathered.

Items referenced from this Exhibition:

• 8th Army ATIS Advanced Echelon, Part One
• 8th Army ATIS Advanced Echelon, Part Two
• 8th Army ATIS Advanced Echelon, Part Three
• HQ | Corps ATIS Advanced Echelon, February 1-19, 1945
• HQ | Corps ATIS Advanced Echelon, April 1-19, 1945 (Part Two)
• Interrogation Reports, Part One
• Interrogation Reports, Part Two

“The real truth of the Kuomintang-Communist problem in China is not one of political differences. It is simply a struggle for political power. The differences are more personal than doctrinal.” (Relations between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang, page 5)

Setting the Stage

Before World War II, the two largest political parties in China were the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Kuomintang (KMT), also known as Guomindang, or the Nationalist Party. They were historically in violent conflict with each other, but during WWII a temporary alliance referred to as the United Second Front pitted both the KMT and CCP against the invading Japanese army instead of against each other. However, after World War II, the fighting between the parties continued, extending into the Chinese Civil War and eventually, after losing the civil war in 1949, many of the KMT leaders retreated to Taiwan, and the CCP founded the People’s Republic of China. 

What happened during the supposed alliance between these two parties? Explore this time period and dynamic through a number of documents and pages in our collection!

Other Excellent Pacific Atrocities Education Posts

For more information about the relationship between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party from early World War II up to 1940, and access to more resources on this topic, visit this post: The Second United Front: A KMT and CCP Alliance in Name, but not in Practice

For more information about the Chinese Civil War between the Kuomintang and the Communists after the end of World War II, and the factors that shaped the Communist victory, visit this post: Civil War of China: Chinese Communist Party vs Kuomintang

A Timeline of Tension in World War II through Archival Reports

1943

In 1943 The Kuomintang were the primary governing power of China, and during that year's last Plenary meeting of the Central Executive Committee, it was demonstrated that China’s internal problems were taking precedence over the war interest. In this report, the author states that open violence between the two parties is unlikely to occur before the war ends, though tensions are high. Indeed, despite the quote presented at the top of this page, fundamental differences between the parties are laid out indicating that the Kuomintang are nationalistic and claim to follow Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People: nationalism, democracy, and people’s livelihoods and that the Communists instead are international and stand for proletarian dictatorship and agrarian revolution, suggesting clear ideological differences that were difficult to overcome. 

1944

In a wide-covering document from the American Embassy in Chungking in 1944, it is indicated that despite Chinese government consideration of a committee dedicated to continuing negotiations with CCP representatives, the Generalissimo--the highest military official-- “entertained little hope of a satisfactory settlement” (page 5).

Later that year, another report was released, detailing information from an interview with General Ho Ying-chin’s (He Yingqin), an important Kuomintang official. This document shows these “personal” differences that are claimed to be at the heart of the Kuomintang-Communist problem and concludes that as their views are diametrically opposed to each other, that this can be expected to continue to cause trouble between the groups. 

For example, the General claimed that the Communist armies were not actually fighting the Japanese but only the Kuomintang, a statement that the report’s author rejects, noting other reports indicating Chinese Communist armies actively resisting the Japanese army, but that the General does not believe. The document from 1943’s declaration that violence between these groups is unlikely during the war does not appear to be a belief reflected by a highstanding member of one of the parties in discussion. The General also entirely rejected the idea of guerilla warfare as something that contributes to the war effort--potentially reflecting the demands of the Central Government towards the Red Army and juxtaposing the Communist leader’s beliefs that their focus “will be most useful for guerrilla operations” (page 2). 

The claims of the General and the Central Government contradicting the information the author and interviewer have about the efforts and successes of the Chinese Communists increasingly show the difficulties in these two groups supposedly trying to work together and indicates that since the previous year, the relationship has not gotten less tense, particularly with the accusations of the Communists killing more Chinese people than Japanese troops, which the General indicated via showing a notebook listing names of those killed to the interviewer.

Even later in 1994, a lengthy document was produced giving information on that years’ meeting of the Third Plenary Session of the People's Political Council, held on September 15 of that year. This document shows the perspectives from a variety of sources on this meeting and included in this document are copies of the original reports being discussed translated into English, allowing readers to construct their own opinions on the proceedings of this meeting. 

During the meeting, General Chang Chih-chung, representing the Kuomintang Government, and Mr. Lin Tsu-han, representing the Chinese Communists, described the four months of negotiations that had been occurring between their two groups and the proposals each party had suggested to one another. This meeting was also open to the public and attended by the whole People's Political Council's membership and around 800 others. Indeed, the initial ideas behind this meeting were potentially positive when considering Kuomintang-Communist relations. As one of the translated report notes, the session being open to the public created a spirit of openness during the meeting and all speakers were courteous and civil. 

That translated report specifically indicates the opinions of Councillors Wang Yun-wu and Hu Lin, and presents an outsider-view of this contentious relationship as seen by how Councillor Wang described himself. He said he is "without party and faction," and his opinions were merely expressed in his "capacity as a citizen and a representative of the people" (page 24-25). Exploring this document allows us to see opinions of people at the time who are perhaps not as biased towards or against either party as previous documents indicating opinions of the Kuomintang or the Communists were about each other. 

Wang described what he believes the root of the Kuomintang-Communist relationship problems are: the popularization of political power and the unification of the military, and what Wang indicates is that members of every party want to eventually democratize the government--something Hu concurs. Wang also describes both parties representatives’ speeches and demeanors as "straightforward and earnest," (page 27) with Wang appearing somewhat hopeful and positive about the potential of Kuomintang-Communist relations, though he notes that these problems will of course still take time to fix.  

Also included in this document are translations of the reports by Minister Chang Chih-Chung and Mr. Lin Tsu-Han, the communist version of Lin's report including a paragraph that did not appear in the official reporting about the meeting published in Chungking by the government, and communist newspaper articles indicating  Communist criticism of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's opening address to the People's Political Council, Communists comment on the negotiations and desire for a reorganization of,  and Communist accusation that Kuomintang organizations have grossly misrepresented Lin Tsu-han's statements in a propagandistic way. 

Many of these reports are not as optimistic as the councillors', particularly the Communist articles, which reflect the still ongoing tensions between these two groups. The Communists accuse the Central Government of not being sincere in their negotiations, of playing tricks and even Lin Tsu-han who was a part of the negotiations and described himself as "inspirited" about them, noted that the two parties had such different ideas of proposals they simply could not agree.

Ultimately, the representatives being able to converse courteously, give their proposals to one another and share this information with the council did not appear to reflect their overarching parties' lack of desire to acquiesce to each other's proposals that would bring them more together. As Lin Tsu-Han stated in his report:

"There is great difference in opinions of the two parties, no final decision in the negotiations have been reached... there is not yet any result that I can report to you after negotiating for all these four months" (page 18)

A final document in our collection on this topic from 1944 is dated to late November and further continues the previous document's discussion of proposals that each political party had for each other, with it noting Chou En Lai, the CCP Representative to Chungking, bringing specific proposals for initiating peace with the Kuomintang Party; proposals primarily reflective of these earlier talks, such as with proposing the Communists' troops be given the same command, standardization, and treatment as all military forces and the sharing of the highest military command.

Clearly, by the end of 1944, though attempts at negotiation appear to have been legitimately made, the specific issues at the heart of the KMT and CCPs disagreements--that of the military and of governmental control--are still unsolved.

1945

1945 was the year that World War II ended, but prior to that, in early 1945, a San Francisco, California-based daily newspaper had an article on the subject. Unlike previous newspaper articles we have recorded on this subject, this newspaper, The Chinese Nationalist Daily is associated with the Kuomintang Party, yet the opinion of their opposing party is similar to how the Communists described the Kuomintang prior--with this article questioning the sincerity of the Chinese Communists' messaging, accusing them of propaganda, and bringing up the issue of military control and government once again, stating that the Central Government was willing to form a coalition government but the Communist's unwillingness to "give up their military power" made this exchange fizzle out (page 2). Years have passed, negotiations have been continually ongoing, and no real progress has been made. 

The last document on this subject was written just a few months before the end of the war and includes additional information that overseas Chinese in New York also have no confidence in the negotiations between the KMT and CCP. This document does actually uncover another complication possibly impeding a potential settlement between those two groups, the claims that the Communists are being backed by "Washington, Moscow and London" (page 1) to increase their demands against the Kuomintang in exchange for uniting their armies. 

What this all Means

None of these documents truly indicate a major event occurring between the Kuomintang and Communists during this time in World War II, no progress and no deterioration. This tension between these political parties has been ongoing for a long time, and their supposed alliance with the Second United Front was not enough to actually fully unify them or even lead them to believe they could be unified as evidenced by the fact that their armies were separate during this part of the war. Their front, militarily speaking, was not, in fact, united. 

Introduction

From the years of 1881 to 1945, the Kempeitai played a significant role in Japanese warfare, acting as the secret military police force of the Japanese army. Throughout its existence, the Kempeitai served as the puppet master in various roles across the Pacific, spreading the power and influence of Imperial Japan through its methods of brutality. The height of the Kempeitei took place during World War II, in which the secret police led several operations, including the control of occupied territories, propaganda, and sourcing of human test subjects.  

Japan’s International Relations during WWII

During World War II, Japan’s international relations were shaped by its strategic goals and shifting alliances. Japan forged alliances with Germany and Italy, and seeked to expand its influence across Asia and the Pacific. At the same time, Japan had to navigate complex diplomatic waters, managing relationships with other countries to avoid unnecessary conflicts. Using items from collection RG457, this exhibit showcases the relations between Japan and other countries during the war. 

Russo-Japanese Relations during WWII

During World War II, Russo-Japanese relations were characterized by a cautious but largely cooperative neutrality, despite the broader conflict involving their respective allies. The Soviet Union and Japan maintained a pragmatic relationship underpinned by the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact of 1941, which allowed both nations to avoid direct conflict. Specific details regarding their relations can be found here (Russo-Japanese Relations July 1945) which include information on Japan's need for oil from USSR and concern about China diplomatic activities, the San Francisco conference, China\Russia diplomatic maneuverings over Outer Mongolia, and Manchukuo (Manchuria). Additional information regarding their relation can also be found in the document Relations between Russia and Japan, documenting the countries relations during the war. 

Sino-Soviet Relations during WWII

Sino-Soviet relations during World War II were initially marked by cooperation as both nations opposed the Axis Powers, though their alliance was complex and fraught with tension. The Soviet Union provided some support to China, which was engaged in a protracted struggle against Japanese invasion. This Sino-Soviet Relations document describes Soviet Russia's plans and intentions for territorial expansion and/or political control in Asia and intentions for political control within the Chinese government. 

Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact

The Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact, signed in April 1941, was a crucial diplomatic agreement that shaped the interactions between the Soviet Union and Japan during World War II. This pact ensured that the two powers would not engage in military conflict against each other, allowing Japan to focus its efforts on other fronts, notably in the Pacific and Southeast Asia. 

Japanese-Portuguese Relations and the Macao Problem

During World War II, Japanese-Portuguese relations were complicated by the strategic significance of Macao, a Portuguese-controlled territory in China. Japan's interest in Macao posed a challenge for Portuguese neutrality and led to diplomatic tensions over the status of this enclave. This source (Japanese-Portuguese Relations and the "Macao Problem") describes a report on recent events in Macao and its effects on Japanese-Portuguese relations. 

Japanese-Thailand Relations during WWII

Japan's relationship with Thailand during World War II was marked by collaboration and mutual benefit as Thailand aligned with Japan to advance its strategic and territorial goals. Thailand, under the leadership of Prime Minister Phibun Songkram, officially joined the Axis Powers and supported Japanese military operations in Southeast Asia. With the rising disapproval of Songkram and a highly organized propoganda program, Japan implemented measures to ignite a "pro-Japanese feeling in Thailand" as described in The Politics of Thailand, successfully integrating themselves into the politics of Thailand. 

Yalta Conference

The Yalta Conference, held in February 1945, was a pivotal event where Allied leaders Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin met to discuss the post-war world, including plans for dealing with Japan. The conference marked a significant point in shaping the final stages of the war and the future of Asia. These Notes on the Crimea (Yalta) Conference provides context into the Yalta Conference.

Japanese Monographs

Japanese Monographs from World War II were a series of detailed studies and reports compiled by the Japanese military and government during the war. These documents were intended to provide comprehensive analyses on various aspects of military operations, strategy, technology, and foreign relations. They served as important tools for understanding and documenting the complexities of the war from a Japanese perspective. Monographs #143-152 in collection #31 fall within this series and focus on specific operational and strategic evaluations.

Monographs #143-152 cover a range of topics, including detailed assessments of military campaigns, technological developments, and strategic lessons learned. These monographs were used to review and analyze the effectiveness of different strategies and technologies employed by the Japanese forces. They were also instrumental in post-war evaluations, helping historians and military analysts understand the strengths and weaknesses of Japanese wartime operations. The monographs were crucial for internal reviews and for shaping future military doctrine.

The background of these monographs lies in Japan's need for thorough documentation of their wartime experiences. The Japanese military sought to learn from their experiences and adapt their strategies accordingly. Monographs #143-152, like others in the series, reflect this approach by offering detailed insights into specific aspects of the war effort, from tactical operations to broader strategic considerations.

Japanese Monographs in this Collection (143-147, 149-152)

Monograph #143: The Battle of Midway
Monograph #144: Naval Air Operations in the South Pacific
Monograph #145: The Burma Campaign and Japanese Strategies
Monograph #146: Naval Battles in the Coral Sea and the Solomon Islands
Monograph #147: The Development of Japanese Submarine Warfare
Monograph #149: The Strategic Use of Air Power in the Pacific Theater
Monograph #150: Japanese Land-Based Air Forces and their Operations
Monograph #151: The Fall of the Philippines and its Consequences
Monograph #152: Analysis of Allied Amphibious Operations in the Pacific